Cognitive modeling is the effort to understand the mind by implementing theories of the mind in computer code producing measures comparable to human behavior and mental activity. The community of cognitive modelers has traditionally met twice every three years at the International Conference on Cognitive Modeling (ICCM). In this special issue of topiCS, we present the best papers from the ICCM meeting. (The full proceedings are available on the ICCM website.) These best papers represent advances in the state of the art in cognitive modeling. Since ICCM was for the first time also held jointly with the Society for Mathematical Psychology, we use this preface to also reflect on the similarities and differences between mathematical psychology and cognitive modeling.
Cognitive modeling is the effort to understand the mind by implementing theories of the mind in computer code producing measures comparable to human behavior and mental activity. This year's meeting was held with the annual meeting of the Society for Mathematical Psychology. This allowed for a lot of cross-talk between communities that both devote themselves to modeling cognition, but in very different ways. The best papers presented in this special issue are representative of the advances in the state of the art in cognitive modeling discussed at the meeting.
The conference demonstrated very well how cognitive modeling could be used to capture complex cognitive phenomena. As two of the papers in this special issue demonstrate, cognitive models can implement verbal theories of psychiatric problems such as rumination (van Vugt et al., this issue) and aphasia (Mätzig et al., this issue) . The advantage of such simulations is that it helps to clarify the nature of the theories, and allows for making predictions about novel situations (in the case of psychiatry, potentially the effect of different interventions). Other talks at the conference itself demonstrated that cognitive architectures could also help to model the effects of emotion on cognition (Chris Dancy), or the effects of meditation on attention (Amir Moye & Marieke van Vugt). In addition, since cognitive architectures typically describe the interaction between different resources, they are a natural model for the interaction between brain areas, as was demonstrated during the conference by Andrea Stocco. Moreover, cognitive architectures can quite literally model whole-brain activity when placed together in an architecture consisting of simulated neurons such as Nengo (Eliasmith et al., 2012) . Such complex systems are difficult to model in simple equations that do not have a mechanism to exert control operations over what processes take place at any particular moment.
The paper by Dotlačil (this issue), moves the field forward by showing how ACT-R models can be used to model eye movements during reading. The data fit were eye movements while participants were reading an Agatha Christie book, and the author shows how the model can predict the modulation of gaze duration and reading time on the basis of word frequency, word position, and word length. Interestingly, this paper also introduces Bayesian methods for estimating model parameters (in contrast to the fit-by-hand that is common in the cognitive modeling community).
A second paper by Mätzig, Vasishth, Englemann, Caplan, and Burchert (this issue) used an ACT-R model based on previous work to evaluate three hypotheses about the observed lower comprehension of sentences by people with aphasia. They demonstrated tighter clustering of model parameters that matched control subjects' behavior compared to those matching the behavior of individuals with aphasia. This demonstrated that differences between the two groups could be explained by different model parameters.
Another domain in which cognitive models can be used is computational psychiatry. Van Vugt, van der Velde, and ESM-MERGE Investigators (this issue) show how cognitive architectures can implement verbal theories of psychiatric problems. Specifically, they show how one theory of depressive rumination--that of maladaptive thought habits--can be implemented in the ACT-R cognitive architecture by changing the contents of its simulated memory. These manipulations of memory habits lead the model to show impairments in a sustained attention task--a plausible impairment given that people who suffer from depression have concentration complaints. The paper has another interesting feature: it uses experience sampling data (selfreport data collected with frequent intervals over the course of daily life) as a data source for modeling. These data are becoming more and more easy to acquire with the increasing prevalence of smartphones, and may therefore be an interesting source of data for future cognitive modeling studies.
In human probabilistic reasoning, we are known to have systematic biases. Costello and Watts (this issue) report on investigating two central aspects of probabilistic reasoning through the use a cognitive model of inferential probability judgement. Their general model of descriptive probability estimation, inferential probability judgement, and the interactions between these two processes made predictions about patterns of agreement and disagreement by people and probability theory that were well supported by experimental results. These results imply that biases in decision making may be explained with noise and without heuristics.
Another apparent trend was the use of neuroscience. The data from neuroscience and physiological studies provide data beyond only behavioral data, which generates additional constraints on the cognitive model. For example, Jelmer Borst showed how a Nengo model can describe both behavioral and magnetoencephalography (MEG) data collected during an associative recognition memory task. The need to fit multiple event-related potentials adds substantial constraints to the model. Since the ICCM conference was held for the first time together with the Society for Mathematical Psychology, an important question is whether the fields of mathematical psychology and cognitive modeling can learn from each other, and whether more interaction is warranted. Mathematical psychology typically concerns itself with relatively simple models consisting of one or two equations that focus on a single phenomenon (such as signal detection theory for recognition memory; see (Kellen et al., 2016) for a recent example), while cognitive modeling typically concerns itself with large-scale cognitive architectures that can be used to model different tasks. Below we outline a few key characteristics of both approaches to modeling cognition that can be of benefit.
The mathematical modeling approach also has various features that may be of interest to the cognitive modeling community. Specifically, mathematical psychology modelers place a lot of emphasis on comparing models by looking at the number of parameters these models have (Pitt et al., 2002) . In contrast, model comparison is relatively less common activity in the cognitive modeling community (cf., Myers et al, 2010) , in part because it is not easy to define the degrees of freedom (and therefore the parameters) of a cognitive architecture model. Nevertheless, a comparison of different versions of a model (e.g., excluding certain production rules) could be a beneficial practice to be adopted from the mathematical psychology community. Another important method in mathematical psychology is the systematic search of parameter spaces for the optimal parameters for predicting a certain behavior (while in the cognitive modeling community parameter searches are often done by hand). Such searches range from grid search (systematically trying out all possible combinations of model parameters) to stochastic methods such as genetic algorithms or Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (see also Dotlačil, this issue) . Moreover, such searches do not need to choose between the individual-subject or group-level, but make more and more use of hierarchical Bayesian estimation methods (e.g., Lee, 2011) , in which the parameter estimates of an individual participant are influenced by the rest of the group. A final lesson from the mathematical modeling community is that not just the average response time and accuracy in each task condition are informative, but subtle differences in the shape of the distribution can tell us a lot as well. For example, in the drift diffusion model, different model parameters cause distinct differences in the simulated response time distribution, and this is what allows the modeler to distinguish them (Ratcliff et al., 2016) . It may be interesting for cognitive modelers to not just focus on the average of a response time distribution but also other aspects of its shape. This conference brought together two communities that do not seem to regularly consider each other's work and by being co-located and to some degree integrated, facilitated the mixing of perspectives and development of shared experiences. Both communities most likely benefited from this interaction. That synergy fueled by the novelty of the interactions is potentially dependent on the relative lack of familiarity of the two communities. Further integration of the two communities may not enhance or even repeat the effect because of the differences that caused them to arise separately in the first place. On the other hand, if serious discussions take place about the approaches and assumptions within each field, the two communities have the potential to strengthen each other.
